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INTRODUCTION: 
The issue of commercial whaling has been a controversial and emotionally fueled 
political topic for nearing half a century. Despite this, the whaling industry has been a 
consistently under-researched field in economics. Additionally, much of what research has been 
done has been limited by political and bureaucratic influences. At the center of this controversy, 
is the Japanese whaling industry, research on which has been highly politicized on both sides of 
the issue.  
 In 1946, the International Whaling Commission (IWC) was established to regulate 
whaling and conserve whale stocks, which Japan, although not an original member of the IWC, 
joined in 1951. In 1982, members of the IWC voted to implement a ban on commercial whaling, 
which came into effect in 1986 ("Japanese Whaling" 2019). This moratorium applied to all 
whales in all waters, with few exceptions for aboriginal hunts and whaling for scientific surveys, 
to be conducted in order to estimate the current stock size (Conrad and Bjørndal 1991). Japan 
continued to hunt whales under scientific research permits, which the Japanese government 
would issue to the Institute of Cetacean Research (ICR), but meat and blubber were ultimately 
delivered to fish markets and government programs for consumption ("Japanese Whaling" 2019).  
In 2013, Australia challenged the legality of Japan’s Antarctic whaling program at the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), and in 2014 the ICJ concluded that the whaling was “not for 
the purposes of scientific research” and ordered Japan to immediately cease its Antarctic whaling 
program. Japan complied with the order, but relaunched the program in 2015 with slightly 
different research objectives; however, the program was clearly meant to meet a commercial 
objective and in 2017 the Japanese Parliamentarians and Fisheries Agency officials publicly 
acknowledged that scientific whaling is Japan’s means to secure an eventual return to 
commercial whaling. In 2018, the IWC rejected Japan’s proposal to resume commercial whaling, 
and in December of that year Japan announced its plan to withdraw from the International 
Whaling Commission. On June 30, 2019 Japan officially withdrew from the IWC and the next 
day, commercial whaling resumed ("Japanese Whaling" 2019; McCurry 2019). 
Clearly, since Japan’s somewhat sudden and unprecedented withdrawal from the 
International Whaling Commission, this is a topic that is in desperate need for academic analysis. 
There have been a number of theories for what this may mean moving forward, both for the 
whaling industry in Japan, and whale populations themselves. Critics of Japan have expressed 
concern that whale stocks will deplete as Japan will no longer be whaling under the guidance of 
the International Whaling Commission. Others have argued that the IWC has had little to no 
impact on how much Japan has been whaling, until the recent case in the International Court of 
Justice where Australia challenged the legality of Japan’s Antarctic Whaling Program. Still more 
have considered that by commercial whaling freely instead of under the pretense of “scientific 
whaling,” the Japanese market for whale products will be able to set the price level and quantity 
of whales caught, which may actually lower the total number of whales harvested. Regardless of 
which, if any of these theories will come to pass, it must first be determined whether the 
International Whaling Commission has had a significant impact on whaling in Japan. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW:  
Although research into this field has been limited, there has been exploration into the 
theoretical results of the resumption of commercial whaling, as well as the political forces that 
have greatly affected the development of whaling management policies for the last several 
decades. Shortly after the establishment of the moratorium banning commercial whaling, 
research into its economic effects had already began. A working paper by Jon Conrad and Trond 
Bjorndal in 1991 expanded research into creating a reliable bioeconomic model for the stock of 
minke whales in the Northeast Atlantic and examined economic arguments for the prohibition of 
commercial whaling. Conrad and Bjorndal discuss factors, such as price-cost ratio and 
productivity, which may determine the optimal stock size and harvest, if commercial whaling to 
resume (Conrad and Bjørndal 1991).  
Several papers found that stock levels of various whale species had recovered to the point 
that the sustainable harvest of certain whale stocks is possible, under certain bioeconomic and 
political conditions (Conrad and Bjørndal 1991; Kuronuma and Tisdell 1994). However, these 
conditions are unlikely, if near impossible to achieve under the current political climate. As 
noted before, political and bureaucratic agendas have influenced both research and policy-
making surrounding this issue. As such, several articles have indicated that the moratorium 
banning commercial whaling has remained in place because of political lobbying from 
conservationists who experienced negative externalities from whaling than because of true 
economic considerations to all parties involved (Blok 2008; Kuronuma and Tisdell 1994; 
Morishita 2006). In particular, economic compromise between pro-whaling and anti-whaling 
groups seems impossible since the former group seeks to form a resource management system 
for whales while the latter tries to prohibit whale exploitation completely (Kuronuma and Tisdell 
1994; Morishita 2006). However, ethical considerations aside, it may be possible to reach a 
compromise if this issue can be treated as one of negative externalities that must be corrected for 
(Kuronuma and Tisdell 1994).  
Research specifically into the Japanese whaling industry is rare, but what little research 
there is seems to come to a few consensuses. Research from the early 2000s’ indicate that a 
complete withdrawal from the International Whaling Commission would not immediately allow 
for profitable commercial whaling for Japan. Several obstacles prevent commercial whaling 
beyond just the 1986 moratorium by the IWC, including several other international conventions, 
large subsidies being provided to the whaling industry currently, and an apparent decrease in 
demand for whaling products over the last several decades (eftc 2009; Okubo 2007). Despite 
this, pro-whaling policies and sentiments remain relatively strong in Japan, which may be 
instigated by a Japanese pro-whaling identity created by a political countermovement throughout 
Japan. Through this, anti-whaling is made out to be emotional, irrational, and an attack on the 
historical legacies and integrity of Japanese whaling communities (Blok 2008). Overall, political 
forces on both sides of this issue make achieving an economically optimal outcome unfeasible.  
 
DATA: 
This research analyzes data from the International Whaling Commission, The Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries in Japan, and the Statistics Bureau of Japan. The data 
consists of the quantity of whales harvested, average price per whale, population, GDP, the 
population born before 1940, number of catcher boats, and the whaling ban in a time-series from 
1960—2012.  
 The quantity of whales harvested was measured in the number of whales caught annually. 
Average price was determined by dividing the total value of the harvest by the number of whales 
caught. The population is a just a measure of the total population of Japan in any given year. 
Population born before 1940 is a measure of consumer preference. Since consumption of whale 
meat increased after world war 2, the population of Japan who were children during that time 
tend to have more pro-whaling sentiments than younger generations and consume more whale 
meat because it is a nostalgia food for them. The number of catcher boats is simply the number 
of vessels on whale hunting expeditions annually. The whaling ban is a dummy variable which 
indicates years when the moratorium banning commercial whaling was in place. These variables 
can be referenced in Table 1 below:  
TABLE 1: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variable Definition 
Quantity of Whales Harvested The annual number of whales caught 
Average Price The total number of whales harvested divided 
by the total value of the harvest, annually 
Population Total population of Japan, annually 
Population born before 1940 Total population of Japan born before 1940, 
annually 
 Boats The number of catcher boats sent on hunting 
expeditions, annually 
Ban Dummy variable determining years when the 
moratorium was in effect 
GDP Total GDP of Japan, annually 
 
 There are some caveats to this data set. The quantity of whales harvested is measured in 
number of whales rather than tons, which would be a more precise measurement, and is not 
distinguished by whale species. As the size and value per whale is likely to vary greatly between 
whale, and between whale species, this means that it is likely that both the measurement for 
quantity and price are imprecise. Additionally, reporting processes for whaling have changed 
over the last several decades, which indicates that the data for the quantity of whales harvested 
might be further skewed by inconsistent reporting.  
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: 
 I utilized two regression techniques in order to build models for this paper. I began with 
an Ordinary Least Squares regression equation, using time-series data, described below:  
 
𝑄 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐵𝑎𝑛)𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑃𝑜𝑝)𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝑃𝑟𝑒1940)𝑡 + 𝛽5(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑠)𝑡 + 𝛽5(𝑌)𝑡 
 
Where:  
• Q is the number of whales harvested 
• (Ban) is a dummy variable for whether the Moratorium banning commercial whaling is in 
effect 
• (Price) is the price per whale 
• (Pop) is the population, (Pre1940) is the population born before 1940 
• (Boats) is the number of vessels sent whaling expeditions 
• (Y) is the GDP of Japan. 
The results of this regression equation are displayed in Table 2 below.  
 
TABLE 2. OLS REGRESSION RESULTS 
Explanatory variable EQ 1 
Intercept 122285.4 
(24168.02) * 
Whaling Ban 393.692 
(769.85) 
Price  0.297 
(0.041) * 
GDP  1.72e-09 
(1.03e-09) 
Population  -1001.95 
(181.88) * 
Population born before 1940 -219.615 
(139.08) 
Catcher Boats  -12.282 
(24.29) 
R2 0.99 
N 53 
Note: standard errors in parentheses 
* Denotes significance at the 95% confidence level. 
 
 
 The regression equation in Table 2 contained some unexpected results. Only two 
variables were found to be statistically significant: Price and Population. Additionally, the 
coefficient for Population had an unexpected sign. The coefficient for Price was 0.297, indicating 
that an increase in price lead to an increase in the quantity harvested, which is consistent with the 
law of supply. This could also possibly be due to the government programs purchasing whale 
meat regardless of market value. This seems to be the most significant factor in determining 
quantity harvested. Additionally, the coefficient for population was -1001.95, indicating that an 
increase in the population decreased the quantity of whales harvested. Although this is 
surprising, I posit that perhaps the time-variable is leading to this unexpected relationship. The 
explanatory variable of interest, Whaling ban, was not found to be statistically significant, and 
the coefficient did not have the expected sign. The coefficient for Whaling ban was 393.692, 
which indicates that the quantity of whales harvested actually increased once the ban on 
commercial whaling was enacted.  
 Next, I used a dynamic model to try to explain the quantity of whales harvested, shown 
below: 
𝑄𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐵𝑎𝑛)𝑡 + 𝜆(𝑄)𝑡−1 
 
Where: 
• Qt is the number of whales harvested in time t 
• (Ban) is a dummy variable for whether the Moratorium banning commercial whaling is in 
effect 
• Qt-1 is the number of whales harvested in time t-1.  
The results of this regression can be seen in Table 3 below.  
 
TABLE 3. DYNAMIC REGRESSION RESULTS 
Explanatory variable EQ 1 
Intercept -768.327 
(801.46) 
Whaling Ban 609.536 
(799.15) 
Lag of Quantity Harvested  1.00 
(0.045) * 
R2 0.98 
N 52 
Note: standard errors in parentheses 
* Denotes significance at the 95% confidence level. 
 
 
 Some of the results for equation 2 were also unexpected. The lagged whaling quantity 
was statistically significant at the 95% confidence level and had a coefficient value of 1.00 
indicating that the quantity of whales harvested in a previous year was significant in determining 
the harvested quantity in the current year. As with the previous equation, the Whaling ban was 
also found to not be statistically significant and had the unexpected sign. In order to check for 
serial correlation that may be causing bias in my dynamic model, A LM test was performed to 
test for serial correlation. However, it was determined that no serial correlation existed at the 
95% confidence level.  
 
  
 
CONCLUSION: 
The purpose of this research was to determine the effect of the commercial whaling ban 
on the harvest of whales in Japan. According to my models, the most significant factor in 
determining the quantity of whales harvested was the price of the whales, indicating that the 
main influence behind whaling is the market forces. However, it is important to not that the 
market itself has been distorted by government subsidies and programs which purchased excess 
whale meat.  The whaling ban was not found to be statistically significant in determining the 
quantity of whales harvested, which was unexpected. This could be due to a variety of reasons. 
To begin with, it has been suggested that political influences and bureaucratic interference within 
the International whaling commission lead to little effective oversight into the “scientific” 
endeavors conducted by Japan, until 2013 when Australia challenged Japan directly. 
Additionally, there were a number of limitations to my research which should be noted. Due to 
the nature of time-series studies, my sample size was relatively low. It is also likely that some of 
my data is inconsistent since survey-taking and reporting procedures for whaling outcomes have 
changed over the last half century. Additionally, a number of likely significant variables could 
not be included; the price of substitutes for whale meat and a strong measure of societal 
sentiments toward whaling and whale-meat could not be found. To further complicate this, the 
value of the whales may have been over-reported due to government subsidies and programs, 
which are likely to have paid more for whale meat than it would receive on the open market. 
Another significant factor that was not included is a prediction of the difficulty level of 
harvesting whales. A whale population bio-economic model would be important here, as a 
decrease in quantity could be due to simply being unable to find whales to harvest, as whale 
stocks decrease. It is also likely that a difference-in-difference comparing Japan to another 
whaling country that did not impose the whaling ban would produce more reliable results. I 
would recommend future research to consider all these factors in future studies, as well as 
recommending future researchers to consider the gap between the vote to ban commercial 
whaling by the International Whaling Commission and when the ban was enacted.  
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